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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have strongly held but inconsistent views regarding the
provision of health services. Americans have traditionally endorsed a
fee-for-service system, which is an application of the free market
concept. The fee-for-service system is, however, fundamentally inconsistent
with the concept of a right to receive health services. If one had a right
to receive health services, then the lack of an ability to pay would be
irrelevant.
The conflict between a fee-for-service system and the right to health
care is manifested in the provision of emergency care. All states impose
statutory or common law duties upon hospitals, public and private, to
provide emergency care to patients in need thereof regardless of the
ability to pay.1 Once patients receive care, however, they must promise
to pay for the care received.2 Emergency care is thus a peculiar
amalgam of a right and a mere service. Although persons in need of
emergency care have an absolute right to the care, they must promise to
pay after receiving it. In regard to other services, payment is a necessary
condition for receiving the service.
An increasingly serious problem relating to the provision of emergency
medical services in this country is the number of individuals who have
no health insurance.3 The economic burden upon states, counties, and
hospitals is becoming insurmountable. The difficulties are especially
significant in California, which has a peculiar system in which the
obligation to support basic medical services for indigent persons is
delegated to the counties, and yet the legal obligation to provide
emergency medical services is imposed upon hospitals, most of which
are private.4 The relationship of the relative obligations of the counties
and hospitals, and the failure of the former to fulfill their statutory
obligations to support emergency medical services for indigent persons,
has created a system of emergency care that is in continual crisis.5

1. See, e.g., St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. City of Phoenix, 764 P.2d 25
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); County of San Diego v. State, 931 P.2d 312, 332–34 (Cal. 1997);
DeCicco v. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n, 573 P.2d. 559 (Colo. App. 1977); Hunt v. Palm
Springs Gen. Hosp., 352 So. 2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); People v. Flushing Hosp.
& Med. Ctr., 471 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Crim. Ct. 1983); Brownsville Med. Ctr. v. Gracia, 704
S.W.2d 68, 76–77 (Tex. App. 1985); Mercy Med. Ctr. of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago
County, 206 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Wis. 1973).
2. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317(d) (West 2008).
3. See, e.g., Michael A. Dowell, The Nation’s Emergency Care Crisis, 11
WHITTIER L. REV. 45, 46, 48 (1989).
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).
5. See Dowell, supra note 3, at 50–51.
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In this Article, the legal obligations of the counties and of hospitals,
respectively, will be examined. An argument will be proffered that the
counties have failed to fulfill their statutory obligations to support
emergency and other basic medical services for indigent persons. This
argument, in conjunction with the fact that hospitals have an unfunded
mandate to provide emergency and related medical services to all
individuals in need thereof, provides a basis for an argument that the
statutory requirement that private hospitals provide emergency and
related medical services to indigent patients constitutes a taking of
private property for a public purpose. Under this theory, the affected
hospitals have a right to reimbursement for uncompensated care that
they provide as a result of their statutory obligation.
II. THE COUNTIES’ OBLIGATION AS PROVIDERS “OF LAST RESORT”
Since 1855, California has imposed a legal obligation on the counties
to provide medical care to indigents. This duty was codified in section
17000 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code in 1965.6 Indeed,
the duty imposed upon the counties is both remarkable and unique. No
other jurisdiction has the responsibility for the overall health and welfare
of its citizens. However, as Bay General Community Hospital v. County of
San Diego indicates, California counties have successfully avoided
fulfilling their obligations under section 17000 for many years.7
A. Bay General Community Hospital v. County of San Diego
Bay General involved a class action suit by private hospitals against
the county of San Diego.8 The plaintiff hospitals, all of which were
privately owned, sought reimbursement from the county for
uncompensated care given to indigent patients.9 Specifically, the action
sought reconsideration and repeal of the county’s 1972 decision to
reimburse only University Hospital, a part of the University of
California.10

6. § 17000.
7. Bay Gen. Cmty. Hosp. v. County of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 184, 186–87 (Ct.
App. 1984).
8. Id. at 185.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 186–87.
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The plaintiff hospitals argued that section 17000 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code imposed upon the county a mandatory
duty to render or at least pay for necessary health care administered by
the hospitals to indigent patients.11 Section 17000 provides:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent,
poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident,
lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by
their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state
or private institutions.12

Further, section 17001 places on the county a mandatory duty to
implement section 17000 with compatible regulations.13
In addition to the above statutory authority, the hospitals based their
argument on the Arizona case St. Joseph’s Hospital & Medical Center v.
Maricopa County.14 In St. Joseph’s, the appellate court interpreted an
Arizona statute that mandated the reimbursement of private hospitals for
the cost of emergency treatment of indigent patients.15 The court stated
that the necessary medical treatment of indigents was a public obligation,
and that except for the emergency situation, the indigents would be cared
for in a public hospital.16
The Bay General court, however, distinguished the holding in St.
Joseph’s on the basis that Arizona statutory law mandates that each
county shall be liable for payment of costs for emergency treatment of
indigents at private hospitals.17 According to the Bay General court, the
difference between Arizona statutory law and sections 17000 and 17001
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code is the discretion vested
in each county’s board of supervisors in implementing the mandatory
duties imposed by sections 17000 and 17001.18 The court concluded
that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the county in

11. Id. at 187.
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009). Further, section
29606 of the California Government Code provides that “[t]he necessary expenses incurred in
the support of the county hospitals, almshouses, and the indigent sick and otherwise dependent
poor, whose support is chargeable to the county, are county charges.” CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 29606 (West 2008). This section has remained unchanged since its adoption in 1947.
Id.
13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009); Bay Gen., 203
Cal. Rptr. at 187.
14. 635 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
15. Id. at 531–32.
16. Id. at 531–33.
17. Bay Gen., 203 Cal. Rptr. at 188–89.
18. Id.
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selecting only one hospital, indeed a public hospital, for reimbursement
for emergency care rendered to indigent patients.19
In regard to the county’s obligation to support indigent patients under
sections 17000 and 17001, the Bay General court referred to an opinion
issued by the California attorney general, which stated in pertinent part:
It seems a reasonable requirement that indigents, in order to qualify for
county medical care, must seek admission to either the county hospital or the
private hospital with which the county has contracted to provide such care.
Having taken reasonable measure to discharge its duty toward the indigent sick,
the county does not become a guarantor to all other hospitals, public or private,
for the care of those indigents who for one reason or another find their way into
those hospitals.20

The attorney general concluded that it was within the discretion of the
county’s board of supervisors to determine if the county had indeed
taken “reasonable steps” to discharge its duty pursuant to sections 17000
and 17001.21 Based upon the fact that the decision to reimburse only
one hospital was within the discretion of the county’s board of
supervisors, and that in any case the board itself had jurisdiction to
determine if the county was fulfilling its statutory obligations, the Bay
General court concluded that the hospitals’ action had no merit.22
The Bay General court supported its conclusion by reference to five
additional arguments. First, the court opined that hospitals that receive
Hill-Burton funds are not really “private” in the relevant sense.23 That
is, hospitals that receive Hill-Burton funds for construction of the
hospital facility must provide a “reasonable” amount of charity care as
consideration for the low cost loans.24 The court argued that if the
plaintiff hospitals were already obligated by contract with the federal
government to provide emergency care, and indeed had received a
valuable consideration for undertaking the obligation, they may not be
heard to demand additional reimbursement.25
Second, the Bay General court cited section 1317(a) of the California
Health and Safety Code, which imposes a mandatory duty on all

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 189–90, 195.
Id. at 189 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 37 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 41, 43 (1961)).
Id. (quoting 37 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 41, 44 (1961)).
Id. at 188–89.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id. at 190.
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hospitals that have emergency rooms to render emergency care
regardless of the patient’s ability to pay.26 The court concluded that
because the plaintiff hospitals were required to provide emergency care
to indigents in any case, they were not detrimented by the county’s
refusal to reimburse the hospitals for the uncompensated care.27
Third, the Bay General court proffered the argument that because
hospitals provide “unique, or scarce, medical resources needed to
preserve life,” hospitals constitute a “public service enterprise” and may
not withhold their services arbitrarily or without reasonable cause.28
Fourth, the court argued that hospitals actually possess the means to
obtain payment for any care rendered to ostensibly indigent patients.29
That is, if patients are impoverished, they qualify for Medicaid (MediCal in California). If patients are not so impoverished as to qualify for
Medi-Cal even if they are uninsured, they must have assets that may be
liquidated to pay for services rendered.30
Finally, the court stated that hospitals may have other sources of
funding for care given, and therefore do not suffer a net loss as a result
of the county’s failure to reimburse the hospitals for the services they
provide.31 Despite the fact that the county of San Diego prevailed in the
Bay General case, each of the arguments proffered by the Bay General
court is suspect. Specifically, each argument was not valid when proffered,
or if valid in 1984, has been rendered inapposite due to significant
changes in circumstances.
The Bay General court’s argument that the county fulfilled its
obligation under sections 17000 and 17001 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code to support indigent patients is suspect for the following
reasons. First, it is doubtful that the county has fulfilled its obligations
by electing to reimburse only University Hospital, a public hospital. The
number of persons in San Diego who lack insurance has dramatically
increased since 1984 and presently amounts to over 19% of the
population under sixty-five.32 This figure is a manifestation of the fact
26. Id.
27. Id. at 190, 193.
28. Id. at 191 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 193.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, Holes in the Health Care Safety Net, in SAN
DIEGO GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 1998–1999, at 178, 184 (1999). See also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-122, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: CONTINUED
EROSION OF COVERAGE LINKED TO COST PRESSURES 53 (1997); E. RICHARD BROWN ET
AL., UCLA CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, THE STATE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN
CALIFORNIA 32 (2009), http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/SHIC_RT_82009.
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that there are 50,000 more people in California without insurance each
month.33
Moreover, in 1995 alone, the twenty-one private hospitals in San
Diego County furnished $145 million in uncompensated care.34 Insofar
as private hospitals accounted for 76% of uncompensated care in the
subject year,35 the Bay General court’s argument that the county has
fulfilled its section 17000 obligation is prima facie invalid with respect
to the provision of health care in recent years.36
The Bay General court’s reference to the California attorney
general’s opinion regarding the county’s section 17000 obligation is
relevant at this juncture. The 1961 attorney general’s opinion stated that
(1) indigents must first seek to receive medical care at a public hospital
or a private hospital with which the county has contracted to furnish
care, and (2) if a county has taken “reasonable measures” to discharge its
duty, it does not become a “guarantor” to all other hospitals for
compensation for rendering care.37 The following points may be made
with respect to the first contention. The reference to a duty on the part
of indigents to first seek services at a public hospital is clearly
inapplicable to emergency care. Reasonable medical practice mandates
that emergency medical personnel transport patients with emergency
medical conditions to the nearest emergency room.38 The comment of
pdf; INTEGRATED HEALTH STRATEGIES, HOSPITAL CARE IN SAN DIEGO: A FRAGILE
BALANCE 8 (1997); A Report on California Hospitals and the Economy (Cal. Hosp.
Ass’n, Sacramento, Cal.), Jan. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.calhospital.org/
Download/CHASpecialReport.pdf.
33. SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 32, at 183; HELEN HALPIN
SCHAUFFLER ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY CTR. FOR HEALTH & PUB. POLICY STUDIES,
T HE S TATE OF H EALTH I NSURANCE IN C ALIFORNIA 7 (1998), http://chpps.berkeley.
edu/ publications/hipp982.pdf.
34. SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 32, at 186.
35. See ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY, HEALTH CARE FOR THE INDIGENT 5 (1999),
http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/GJHealth.pdf; SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra
note 32, at 186.
36. Indeed, in a 1998 study, the Urban Institute concluded that San Diego’s safety
net system is among the most vulnerable in the country. STEPHEN A. NORTON & DEBRA
J. LIPSON, URBAN INST., PUBLIC POLICY, MARKET FORCES, AND THE VIABILITY OF SAFETY
NET PROVIDERS 21 (1998), http://urban.org/publications/308041.html. See also PROJECT
MGMT. COMM. ON OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING HEALTH COVERAGE TO UNINSURED SAN DIEGANS,
IMPROVING ACCESS TO HEALTH COVERAGE 1–24 (1999) [hereinafter IMPROVING ACCESS
TO HEALTH COVERAGE].
37. 37 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 41, 43–44 (1961).
38. See, e.g., Bay Gen. Cmty. Hosp. v. County of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 184,
186 n.2 (Ct. App. 1984).
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the attorney general is relevant only to nonemergency situations and to
informed and mobile indigent patients. Moreover, the second contention
made in the opinion by its terms is applicable only if the county has
taken “reasonable measures” to fulfill its section 17000 obligation. The
1995 statistics indicate that the county has not in fact taken reasonable
measures to fulfill its section 17000 obligation.
The Bay General court’s reference to the Hill-Burton obligations of
the plaintiff hospitals is moreover suspect. The court made no actual
determination that any of the hospitals had current Hill-Burton
obligations. Further, even if certain hospitals had outstanding HillBurton obligations, such obligations mandate only that hospitals furnish
a “reasonable” amount of charity care.39 The Bay General court made
no determination as to the amount of care given to indigents by any of
the plaintiff hospitals. As indicated above, the number of patients with
no health insurance has steadily and greatly increased since 1984.
Insofar as one in five patients in San Diego County has no health
insurance, it is reasonable to infer that the burden of uncompensated care
exceeds the quantum of “reasonable” amount of charity care mandated
by Hill-Burton.40 This inference is also justified by the extraordinary
increase in the cost of emergency health care since 1984.41 Moreover,
the court’s argument is invalid with respect to the current situation in
San Diego because no hospitals in San Diego County have Hill-Burton
obligations.42 Further, even if a hospital did have remaining Hill-Burton
obligations in 1984, it may have been exempt from the requirement to
provide charity care if to do so is “not feasible from a financial
viewpoint.”43 The Bay General court made no reference to the exemption
with regard to any of the plaintiff hospitals.
Further, the hospitals’ obligation to furnish emergency medical
treatment is an entirely distinct issue from the county’s obligation to
provide or pay for emergency medical treatment for indigents. The Bay
General court’s argument is therefore a false bifurcation. It may well be

39. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a) (2008).
40. The amount of charity care recipient hospitals are required to furnish has, since
1972, been the lesser of either 3% of the operating cost of the hospital or 10% of the
value of all federal assistance received by the hospital. Id.
41. Dowell, supra note 3, at 46; see also Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in
Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 389, 394–95 (1988).
42. Indeed in San Diego County, only one facility, a neighborhood clinic that
provides only outpatient services, has Hill-Burton obligations. See Health Res. & Servs.
Admin., Hill-Burton Facilities Obligated To Provide Free or Reduced-Cost Health Care,
http://www.hrsa.gov/hillburton/hillburtonfacilities.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2006).
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that private hospitals are legitimately required to render emergency care
to indigents and that the county is legitimately required to reimburse
hospitals.
The argument that a hospital is a “public enterprise” insofar as it is the
unique source of lifesaving services is subject to the same remarks as the
argument regarding section 1317a of the California Health and Safety
Code. That is, terming hospitals a “public enterprise” may entail that the
public entity has a duty to fund the services that hospitals are mandated
to provide.
The Bay General court’s argument that the plaintiff hospitals suffered
no damage as they could obtain compensation from “other sources” may
have had some validity in 1984. At that time, the federal government’s
emendation of its payment schedule from a retrospective system to a
prospective system had not yet manifested its effects.44 The flat rate
system of payments for Medicare and Medicaid based upon Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs) ultimately resulted in reimbursements of
portions of sums billed to the federal government by providers.45
Further, soon after the federal government adopted the prospective
payment scheme, the phenomenon of managed care emerged, especially
in southern California. Managed care evolved into the private sector’s
version of DRGs.46 Due to the federal government’s and the private
sector’s adoptions of prospective payment systems, the profit margins of
hospitals were dramatically reduced.47 As a result, hospitals’ traditional
ability to “cost-shift” or obtain reimbursement for charity care from
other sources of payment has been greatly constrained.48 In addition,
given the increase in the number of uninsured patients since 1984, it is
44. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan, Commercialism in Nonprofit Hospitals, in TO PROFIT
OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 151,
154–55 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
45. Id. See also FRANK A. SLOAN & BRUCE STEINWALD, INSURANCE, REGULATION,
AND HOSPITAL COSTS (1980); John J. Antel et al., State Regulation and Hospital Costs,
77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 416 (1995).
46. See MICHAEL M. MORRISEY, COST SHIFTING IN HEALTH CARE: SEPARATING
EVIDENCE FROM RHETORIC 23–33 (1994); James C. Robinson, Decline in Hospital
Utilization and Cost Inflation Under Managed Care in California, 276 JAMA 1060
(1996) [hereinafter Robinson, Decline]; James C. Robinson, Health Care Purchasing
and Market Changes in California, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 117; (1987); James C.
Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982,
257 JAMA 3241 (1987); Sloan, supra note 44, at 155–60.
47. See Robinson, Decline, supra note 46, at 1063.
48. See MORRISEY, supra note 46, at 71–73.
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patent that the Bay General court’s reliance upon “other sources” of
payments in its decision is now inapposite.
Finally, the Bay General court’s argument that indigent patients have
assets that may be liquidated to pay for medical services that they
receive is surely fanciful. The majority of uninsured persons are those
who have low paying jobs without health benefits.49 Such persons have
few valuable assets and are effectively judgment proof. Uninsured
persons use emergency rooms as providers of primary medical services
because they often cannot afford to pay for medical care on a fee-forservice basis.50 Emergency care is, in turn, mandatory and exceedingly
expensive.51 The working poor are in fact the class of persons least
likely to have sufficient assets for a hospital to pursue through litigation.
As a result, hospitals rarely pursue uninsured persons through the legal
process.
The unbridled discretion exercised by the county of San Diego with
respect to whether or not it has fulfilled its statutory duties pursuant to
section 17000 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code has
predictably led to the county’s spending relatively little on indigent
health care.52 Based on the above discussion, therefore, it may be
concluded that to the extent any of the arguments proffered by the Bay
General court in support of its holding were valid in 1984, they are
presently deserving of reconsideration.
B. Bay General Reconsidered: The Holdings in County of
San Diego v. State53 and Hunt v. Superior Court54
The concept of absolute discretion with respect to the decision by
counties to fund the medical treatment of indigent persons articulated in
Bay General remained in effect until 1997. On March 3, 1997, the
California Supreme Court issued its decision in County of San Diego v.
State.55 In that case, San Diego County had attempted to obtain

49. See SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 32, at 184.
50. CAL. ASS’N OF PUB. HOSPS. & HEALTH SYS., CAPH REPORT 1–2 (2009),
http://www.caph.org/newsreleases/EconomicImpactReport2_11_09.pdf.
51. SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 32, at 186.
52. Id. at 185–87. See also County of San Diego v. State, 931 P.2d 312, 316–17
(Cal. 1997); Bay Gen. Cmty. Hosp. v. County of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187–93
(Ct. App. 1984).
53. 931 P.2d. 312.
54. 987 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1999).
55. County of San Diego, 931 P.2d at 312.
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reimbursement from the state for the costs of care furnished to adult
indigents.56
In order to resolve the above issue, the supreme court first reviewed
the history of the Medi-Cal program. Medi-Cal was established in 1966
in order to provide “basic and extended health care services for
recipients of public assistance and for medically indigent persons.”57
Eligibility for Medi-Cal was, however, initially limited to persons who
qualified for a federal categorical aid program by age, blindness,
disability, or membership in a family with dependent children.58
Individuals not qualified in the requisite sense were ineligible for MediCal, regardless of their means.59 These individuals not covered by MediCal and unable to afford medical care remained the responsibility of the
counties.60 In order to help defray the counties’ financial burden of
providing health services for indigent persons who did not qualify for
Medi-Cal, in 1971, the California legislature established the “county
option” according to which the state would reimburse counties for the
cost of furnishing medical care to indigent patients.61
In 1982, the legislature passed two Medi-Cal reform bills that had the
effect of excluding from Medi-Cal coverage most adults who had been
previously eligible for benefits.62 At the same time, however, the state
created the Medically Indigent Services Account as a mechanism for
transferring state funds to the counties for the provision of medical
services to indigent adults.63
Subsequent to the passage of the 1982 legislation, San Diego County
established a County Medical Services (CMS) program to provide health
services to indigent patients not covered by Medi-Cal.64 In the litigation
56. Id. at 314. It is ironic that the county vigorously pursued reimbursement for its
relatively small expenditure for uncompensated care, in light of its refusal to reimburse
private hospitals.
57. Id. at 315 (quoting Morris v. Williams, 433 P.2d 697, 700 (Cal. 1967)).
58. Id. at 316.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 317.
63. Id. at 318.
64. Id. In 1997 and 1998, only 21,000 of 645,000 uninsured persons were treated
through the CMS program. SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 32, at 180.
Further, the CMS reimbursement rate is less than 20% of actual cost. Id. at 187. As a
result, even public hospitals in San Diego County have declined to participate in the
CMS program. Id.
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leading to the decision in County of San Diego, the county claimed that
the state’s reimbursements to the county for the provision of medical
care to indigents through the CMS program from 1989 to 1990 were
inadequate.65 In February 1991, the San Diego Board of Supervisors
voted to terminate the CMS program unless the state immediately agreed
to provide full funding for the 1990 to 1991 fiscal year.66 After the state
had refused to provide additional funding, the county notified affected
individuals and health care providers that it intended to terminate the
CMS program, effective March 19, 1991.67
In addition to announcing its intention to terminate the CMS program,
the county filed suit against the state on the basis that the 1982
legislation that imposed upon the counties the obligation to provide
health services to indigent adults constituted an unfunded mandate in
violation of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.68
The supreme court agreed with the county: “[O]ur discussion demonstrates
the Legislature excluded adult [medically indigent persons] from MediCal knowing and intending that the 1982 legislation would trigger the
counties’ responsibility to provide medical care as providers of last
resort under section 17000.”69 After holding that the exclusion of
medically indigent adults from Medi-Cal constituted an unlawful
unfunded mandate, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial
court to determine the amount of reimbursement due to San Diego
County by the state.70
Essential to the supreme court’s decision, however, was the finding
that the county was subject to a mandate.71 That is, the supreme court
held that the county was obligated to provide care for indigent adults
because it had a duty to support all indigent persons pursuant to section
17000:
[S]ection 17000 requires Counties to relieve and support “‘all indigent persons
lawfully resident therein, “when such persons are not supported and relieved by
their relatives” or by some other means.’” Moreover, section 10000 declares
that the statutory “purpose” of division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
which includes section 17000, “is to provide for protection, care, and assistance
to the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote the welfare
and happiness of all of the people of the state by providing appropriate aid and
services to all of its needy and distressed.” (Italics added.) Thus Counties have no

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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County of San Diego, 931 P.2d at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 336.
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discretion to refuse to provide medical care to “indigent persons” within the
meaning of section 17000 who do not receive it from other sources.72

In a footnote attending the above passage, the supreme court stated:
We disapprove Bay General insofar as it (1) states that a county’s responsibility
under section 17000 extends only to indigents as defined by the county’s board
of supervisors, and (2) suggests that a county may refuse to provide medical
care to persons who are “indigent” within the meaning of section 17000 but do
not qualify for Medi-Cal.73

In its reference to the Bay General decision, the supreme court
eviscerated the concept of absolute discretion on the part of the county to
furnish medical care to indigents.74 Instead, consistent with the plain
meaning of section 17000, the court held that the county must provide
health services to all indigents.75 It would seem that the only discretion
allowed the counties is to decide whether to reimburse other providers
that furnish the medical care or to provide the services directly. The
supreme court’s opinion is even more striking inasmuch as it nods
approvingly toward lower courts’ holdings as well as statutory and
legislative histories that interpret section 17000 obligations to encompass
not only emergency care but also “medically necessary care.”76 That is,
section 17000 requires the provision of health services at a level that
prevents “unnecessary suffering” or the endangerment of life and
health.77 Therefore, the section 17000 obligation, as broadly construed
by the supreme court, could encompass therapies such as organ transplants
and treatments for chronic conditions such as kidney dialysis and
AIDS.78
In Hunt v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court reiterated
and explained its holding in County of San Diego that section 17000

72. Id. at 332 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 332 n.23.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 332–33.
76. Id. at 335–36 (quoting County of Alameda v. State Bd. of Control, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 487, 494 (Ct. App. 1993)).
77. Id. (quoting Tailfeather v. Bd. of Supervisors, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 265 (Ct.
App. 1996)). It is also important to note that after receiving emergency care, many
patients with significant illnesses or injuries will be in need of “medically necessary”
care, often for prolonged periods of time.
78. Indeed, nearly one-half of individuals served by San Diego’s CMS program
have chronic medical conditions such as hypertension, diabetes, and AIDS. See IMPROVING
ACCESS TO HEALTH COVERAGE, supra note 36, at 35.
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subdivision (a) does not delineate the scope of health services that
counties must provide to indigent persons.79 The court held that the
obligation was defined by section 17000, as outlined in its decision in
County of San Diego.80 In County of San Diego, the supreme court
reiterated its disapproval of the holding in Bay General, stating that
(1) “a county’s responsibility under section 17000 extends only to
indigents as defined by the county’s board of supervisors,” and (2) “a
county may refuse to provide medical care to persons who are ‘indigent’
within the meaning of section 17000 but do not qualify for Medi-Cal.”81
The supreme court accordingly reasserted that counties are obligated to
provide medical services to persons who do not qualify for receipt of
medical services under any other specialized aid programs.82 As in
County of San Diego, the supreme court in Hunt defined an “indigent”
patient as “one who has insufficient means to pay for his maintenance in
a private hospital after providing for those who legally claim his
support.”83 The court also reiterated holdings that section 17000
requires the provision of services at a level that prevents “unnecessary
suffering” or the “endanger[ment] of life and health,” and that is
“humane” and “avoid[s] substantial pain and infection.”84 The court
concluded that counties have a duty to furnish “subsistence” health
services, as previously defined, “promptly and humanely.”85 Under
the court’s holding, counties retain the discretion to determine how to
meet the above standard, but meet it they must.86 The scope of the
obligation to support indigent patients must, however, also be
established.
C. Indeterminacy in the Level of Care Mandated by Section 17000
It may appear that after an extended period of time during which
California counties were allowed to escape their statutory obligations to
support indigent patients, the California Supreme Court’s decisions in
San Diego County and Hunt should have at least theoretically brought an
end to the counties’ irresponsibility. Several material issues remain to
be resolved, however, before a coherent county health policy may be

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d 705, 718 (Cal. 1999).
Id. at 718.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
Id. (quoting County of San Diego v. State, 931 P.2d 312, 334 (Cal. 1997)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 726–27.
Id. at 727.
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formulated. For instance, the level of care mandated by section 17000 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code must be determined. In its
concluding remarks in the Hunt case, the California Supreme Court
stated:
[R]ecognizing such an obligation neither requires the County to satisfy all
unmet needs nor mandates universal health care. . . . The Legislature has eliminated
any requirement that counties provide the same quality of health care to residents
who cannot afford to pay as that available to nonindigent individuals receiving
health care services in private facilities. [Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection
10000 imposes a minimum standard of care—one requiring that subsistence
medical services be provided promptly and humanely. Counties retain discretion to
determine how to meet this standard, but they may not deny subsistence medical
care to residents based upon criteria unrelated to individual residents’ financial
ability to pay all or part of the actual cost of such care.87

The supreme court added that the “subsistence” standard articulated
above includes medical services “necessary for the treatment of acute
life-and-limb-threatening conditions and emergency medical services
within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1317.”88
Further, the “subsistence” standard of health care referred to by the
supreme court in Hunt is presumptively coextensive with the “medically
necessary” standard that the supreme court articulated in San Diego
County.89 The standard articulated in Hunt was derived from the decision
in Tailfeather v. Board of Supervisors. 90 Tailfeather involved an
unsuccessful attempt by indigent residents of the county of Los Angeles
to compel the county to adopt formal written standards regarding waiting
time for medical care for indigents.91 Although the Tailfeather court
upheld the dismissal of the indigents’ action, it issued parameters
regarding the level of care to be provided pursuant to section 17000 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code.92 As precedent, the
Tailfeather court referred to the decision in Cooke v. Superior Court,
which determined the level of dental care mandated by section 17000.93
The Cooke court held that section 17000 required that counties provide
dental services “necessary to alleviate substantial pain, to treat infection,

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 726–27 (citations omitted).
Id. at 726.
See supra Part II.B.
Tailfeather v. Bd. of Supervisors, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 262–63 (Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263; Cooke v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (Ct. App. 1989).
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to maintain basic function, to maintain adequate nutrition, and to care for
dental conditions which present a serious health risk.”94 Services to be
rendered included amalgam restorations, anterior root canals, and
denture repair.95
It may be, however, that it is not feasible to create a suitable list of
medical procedures that would be encompassed by the section 17000
obligation. That is, the number of possible medical procedures is
relatively much greater than that of dental procedures. Therefore, even
if an approximate designation of the former may be feasible, that fact
does not imply that a manageable designation of medical procedures is
possible. For instance, one of the dental procedures that the Cooke court
validated was the treatment of infection.96 In the context of dental
procedures, this designation is properly interpreted as referring to oral
bacteriological infection. In a medical context, however, infection can
be the result of either bacteriological or viral causes. The treatment of
infection could be taken to include not only simple treatment with
antibiotics for an acute bacteriological infection but also prolonged and
extensive treatment for chronic conditions such as HIV infection and
AIDS.
The indeterminacy in the level of care that the counties must furnish
indicates a more fundamental difficulty with the section 17000 mandate
as articulated by the California Supreme Court. Insofar as the court
interprets the section 17000 obligation to be less stringent than the
prevailing standard of care, the court has abrogated any objective basis
for evaluating whether or not counties have satisfied their section 17000
obligations. That is, the ordinary “community of physicians” standard
has traditionally constituted the legal standard for adequate health care.97
The proper level of care under this standard can be ascertained by
reference to established medical practice. To the extent that the level of
care mandated by section 17000 is not identical to the community
standard, the former standard is nebulous. Because the proper care
pursuant to section 17000 will, in the case of each treatment or category
of treatment, not be determined by reference to the community standard,
it presumably can only be established as a result of litigation. The level
of care in any given case will moreover be the result of a quasi-legal
criterion, as the prevailing medical practice will not be dispositive. One
result may be expensive, inefficient, and protracted litigation, at least
94.
95.
96.
97.
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Cooke, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 709, 714.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 714–15.
See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, BAJI 6.00.1 (Spring ed. 2009).
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until general judicial interpretations of section 17000 standards are
established. Another result may be extreme divergence among the
counties in terms of the level of medical care due to differences in
interpretation of the scope of the section 17000 obligation.
Further, to the extent that the section 17000 standard of care differs
from the community standard, persons who provide health services to
indigents may feel compelled to distinguish between patients in terms of
the level of care that they provide to patients. Finally, insofar as the
section 17000 standard of care is below that mandated by the community
standard, untoward long-term results may occur. For example, the
funding of treatment only for “serious” health risks may lead to
treatment for heart attacks and strokes but not high blood pressure, even
if treatment for the latter were included in the community standard of
care. The failure to intervene until the health risk is “substantial” may in
the long-term be more expensive, be less efficient, and cause more
suffering.
The uncertainty with respect to the mandated level of care may also be
illustrated by a consideration of the result in Payton v. Weaver.98 Brenda
Payton was a thirty-five-year-old woman who suffered from end stage
kidney disease and associated complications, as well as from psychological
problems that made it difficult for her to conform to a treatment
regimen.99 To survive, Payton required kidney dialysis two or three
times per week for a period of several hours.100 Subsequent to receiving
treatment for her disease from respondent’s physician and health care
center for a period of three years, Payton attempted to legally compel
continued treatment of her condition indefinitely.101 Payton applied for a
writ of mandate to compel treatment on the basis that her condition
constituted an “emergency” pursuant to section 1317 of the California
Health and Safety Code.102 Payton argued that her illness was itself an
emergency in that it required that she receive treatment every third day
in order “to avoid death.”103

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 229–30.
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The trial court denied Payton’s petition, holding that end stage renal
disease is not itself an “emergency” pursuant to section 1317.104 The
court stated that if the patient obeys medical orders and receives regular
medical attention, the condition will not result in an emergency
situation.105 Although the trial court denied Payton’s petition, it stayed
enforcement of its order pending Payton’s appeal of the ruling.106 The
court of appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial court:
While end stage renal disease is an extremely serious and dangerous disease,
which can create imminent danger of loss of life if not properly treated, the need
for continuous treatment as such cannot reasonably be said to fall within the
scope of section 1317. . . . If a patient suffering from such a disease or condition
were to appear in the emergency room of a hospital in need of immediate lifesaving treatment, section 1317 would presumably require that such treatment be
provided. But it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to impose upon
whatever health care facility such a patient chooses the unqualified obligation to
provide continuing preventative care for the patient’s lifetime.107

The Payton court based its conclusion upon the distinction between a
dangerous condition that, with proper medical supervision and prudent
conduct on the part of the patient, will not manifest its potential
dangerous propensities and an emergency condition that will result in the
absence of such preventative measures.108 Thus, the Payton court appears
to base its decision on the distinction between chronic and acute
conditions. Section 1317 is intended to apply to acute conditions, which
constitute immediate threats to life, and not to chronic conditions, which
merely have the potential to manifest themselves as such threats.109
It is however unclear whether chronic conditions such as renal failure
would be covered under the “subsistence” standard of health care
articulated in Tailfeather and San Diego County. It could be argued that
for the same reasons that the Payton court held that section 1317 of the
California Health and Safety Code did not apply to renal failure, it
would not be included in the subsistence standard. That is, properly
treated renal failure does not constitute “endangerment” of health or
basic function. On the other hand, it could be argued that renal failure in
and of itself constitutes a serious threat to health and basic function. For
example, the necessity of hemodialysis three days a week for several

104. Id. at 229.
105. Id. at 230.
106. Id. at 231.
107. Id. at 230. To ensure continued treatment for Payton, the appellate court suggested
placement in a private psychiatric facility. Id. at 231.
108. Id. at 230.
109. Id.
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hours at a time is arguably a threat to and interferes with basic function.
Indeed, if treatment for renal failure is not included in the subsistence
standard, uninsured persons suffering from renal failure will not be able
to adequately maintain treatment for their condition and will experience
a crisis. Moreover, the distinction between chronic and acute conditions
is less clear in regard to degenerative conditions such as diabetes and
AIDS. Even with proper monitoring and medical care, many persons
with such afflictions will experience deterioration of their conditions
over time.
D. The Failure of the Counties To Fulfill Their Obligation To
Serve as the Provider “of Last Resort”
The indeterminacy regarding the level of care that the counties are
mandated to provide under section 17000 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code serves to compound the uncertainty that remains
regarding California counties’ duty as the health care provider of last
resort. After the decisions in the San Diego County and Hunt cases,
however, it would seem that the counties have no discretion to avoid that
function. Nonetheless, the rulings have had little or no effect on the
problem of uncompensated care in California. In fact, in the decade
following the decision in San Diego County, the number of hospital and
emergency closures accelerated at an unprecedented rate. From 1998
through 2007, sixty-one hospitals closed, and fourteen hospitals remained in
service only by closing their emergency departments.110 That is, a total
of seventy-five emergency departments closed in the years following the
San Diego County and Hunt decisions.
In San Diego County alone, the setting for the seminal 1997 case San
Diego County, eighteen emergency departments have closed since
2005.111 Hospitals in the state as a whole provided more than $10 billion
in uncompensated care in 2008.112

110. Closed California Hospitals, L.A. TIMES, http://projects.latimes.com/hospitals/
emergency-rooms/no/closed/list/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); Open California Hospitals
that Closed an Emergency Room Between 1998 and 2007, L.A. TIMES, http://projects.
latimes.com/hospitals/emergency-rooms/no/open/list/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
111. Closed California Hospitals, supra note 110; Open California Hospitals, supra
note 110.
112. A Report on California Hospitals and the Economy, supra note 32, at 2.
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Further, 33% of California hospitals reported an increase in the
number of uninsured ER patients in 2008.113 It has been estimated that
currently in the United States only approximately 55% of emergency
care is compensated.114 As an inevitable result, access to emergency
care in California has been rated as one of the worst in the country,
receiving a grade of F.115 The American College of Emergency Physicians
has termed the system as one that is in crisis.116 California emergency
departments suffer from a serious deficiency in the number of specialists,
registered nurses, and mental health providers.117 The large number of
emergency department closures has rendered California with a ratio of
only 7.1 emergency departments per 1 million people, compared to an
average of 19.9 among the states.118 California also has a critical
shortage of staffed inpatient and psychiatric beds.119
It is not surprising that the holdings in the San Diego County and Hunt
cases have not prevented the crisis in access to emergency care.
Although the California Supreme Court has declared that the counties
are the health care provider of last resort for indigent patients,120 the
criteria for “indigence” nonetheless varies greatly from county to county,
ranging from less than 100% to 300% of the federal poverty level.121 In
Alford v. County of San Diego, a California court of appeal struck down
San Diego County’s rigid standard for assistance of $1078 per month as
violative of its duty to provide health services as a last resort.122 The
court held that the county must adopt standards that support the
provision of medically necessary care and not just emergency services:
The County asserts that adoption of such a rule would require the County to
“satisfy all unmet health care needs” or “provide universal health insurance.”
Just such an argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Hunt: “Contrary to
[Sacramento County’s] assertion, recognizing such an obligation neither requires

113. Id.
114. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, The Uninsured: Access to Medical Care,
http://www.acep.org/patients.aspx?id=25932 (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
115. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, THE NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON THE
STATE OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE 25 (2009), available at http://www.emreportcard.org/
uploadedFiles/ACEP-ReportCard-10-22-08.pdf.pdf.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. County of San Diego v. State, 931 P.2d 312, 330 (Cal. 1997).
121. County Programs for the Medically Indigent in California, FACT SHEET (Cal.
HealthCare Found., Oakland, Cal.), Aug. 2006, at 2–3, http://www.chcf.org/documents/
policy/CountyPrgrmsMedicallyIndigentFactSheet.pdf.
122. Alford v. County of San Diego, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 605–06, 609 (Ct. App.
2007).
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the County to satisfy all unmet needs, nor mandates universal health care. . . .
The Legislature has eliminated any requirement that counties provide the same
quality of health care to residents who cannot afford to pay as that available to
nonindigent individuals receiving health care services in private facilities. . . .
Section 10000 imposes a minimum standard of care—one requiring that subsistence
medical services be provided promptly and humanely.” As stated above, “section
17000 requires provision of medical services to the poor at a level which does
not lead to unnecessary suffering or endanger life and health.” Thus, section 17000
is designed to allow only necessary treatment for serious illness and injury, as the
plaintiffs in this case have suffered. They are seeking treatment for such serious
ailments as diabetes, serious lung infections, thyroid disease, high blood
pressure, and malignant melanoma. They are not asking that all of the medical
care of indigents, including the routine care enjoyed by nonindigents, be paid for by
the County.123

As of June 2009, reflecting the holding in Alford, the upper limit for
assistance for an indigent adult in San Diego County is 350% of the
2009 federal poverty level of $10,830 for a single-family household.124
Nonetheless, despite the emendation of the upper limit for assistance,
it is evident that many individuals with significant health needs are too
“rich” to qualify for assistance. This fact illuminates why as of 2007
over 19% of residents of San Diego had no health coverage of any
kind.125 The “working poor,” employed persons with no health care
insurance, often utilize emergency departments as their primary source
of health services.126 As a result, in 2008, the CMS program estimated
that 44% of emergency room visits by its Standard Eligibility Users in
San Diego County involved care that could have been rendered in other
less costly facilities.127 Moreover, due to the present untoward economy,
California public hospitals can expect a significant increase in the
volume of uninsured patients in their emergency departments.128

123. Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
124. See COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY, COUNTY OF
SAN DIEGO MEDICAL SERVICES (CMS) PROGRAM: HOSPITAL HANDBOOK, at 2.2 (2009),
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/hhsa/programs/ssp/documents/HospitalHandbook.pdf.
125. BROWN ET AL., supra note 32, at 32. The poverty line in San Diego County has
been estimated to be $53,426. The cost of living index in San Diego County is 186.95
compared to the national average of 100. See Numsum.com, Cost of Living—County of
San Diego, California, http://cf.numsum.com/spreadsheet/show/43147 (last visited Jan.
30, 2010). The cost of living in San Diego is 47% above the national average. Dean
Calbreath, San Diego County 11th Among Metro Areas in Cost of Living, Council Says,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 23, 2008, at C1.
126. CAL. ASS’N OF PUB. HOSPS. & HEALTH SYS., supra note 50, at 1.
127. IMPROVING ACCESS TO HEALTH COVERAGE, supra note 36, at 23, 35.
128. CAL. ASS’N OF PUB. HOSPS. & HEALTH SYS., supra note 50, at 1–2.

165

Another issue is that the burden of pursuing reimbursement is placed
upon the hospital, not the county. The Alford court held that when
setting standards for reimbursement for the cost of care for indigent
persons, counties are not required to perform individual needs
assessments, but rather may utilize cost-of-living statistics coupled with
mechanisms to ensure that deserving individuals qualify for assistance:
[T]here are several alternative methods of providing care to those with a limited
ability to pay. The County could institute a sliding scale fee system, in which
health care services are priced based upon ability to pay. It could enact an
income limit for free care, supplemented by provisions permitting those over the
limit to apply for medical and financial hardship exceptions. The County could
set an income cap that is sufficiently high that those exceeding the limit will
have the means to obtain health care. Because of the discretion vested in the
County to select standards for subsistence medical care to indigents under
section 17000, this court will not mandate a particular vehicle to achieve that
result. However, counties “have no discretion to refuse to provide medical care
to ‘indigent persons’ within the meaning of section 17000 who do not receive it
from other sources.” Because the current income cap results in a denial of
subsistence medical care to such individuals, it is void.129

There are, however, several difficulties with the Alford holding. First,
from the standpoint of the private hospitals, which must provide care to
indigent patients, the process of qualification may fail at various points.
Certain individuals may simply refuse or otherwise fail to follow
procedures relating to qualification, or even if they qualify, they could
fail to pay for services received. Indeed, the reference to the reception
based upon the “ability to pay” is irrelevant in regard to the reception of
emergency and associated care, which hospitals must provide regardless
of the ability to pay.
As noted, private hospitals are declaring bankruptcy at an alarming
rate due to the large amount of charity care and bad debt. Hospitals
simply become creditors for individuals who receive necessary services
but cannot pay. If the takings argument is valid, then at the very least
the public entity—the state, the county, or both—should assume the risk
of the bad debt resulting from the involuntary provision of emergency
care and related services. If so, the hospitals should be reimbursed for
rendering such care. The public entities, which are in a much stronger
position to recover the costs of treatment, should assume the risk of
obtaining funds from individuals receiving such care.
Second, as noted in Tailfeather, section 17000 does not require
counties to fund the same level of care for indigent patients as is

129. Alford v. County of San Diego, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 611 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations
omitted) (quoting County of San Diego v. State, 931 P.2d 312, 332 (Cal. 1997)).
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provided to those patients with medical insurance.130 The legal standard
of care required of hospitals, however, makes no allowance for inadequate
reimbursement. Physicians at hospitals are required to provide the same
level of care to all patients.131
Third, section 17000 only provides support for California residents
and legal aliens.132 Pursuant to federal and state law, emergency
departments are required to provide emergency care to all patients in
need thereof, regardless of their citizenship.133
It is apparent that the requirement that California counties serve as the
provider of medical services of last resort has not alleviated the problem
of uncompensated emergency and related medical treatment. An alarming
number of emergency departments and a smaller number of hospitals
have in the last decade become insolvent. To fully resolve the issue of
uncompensated emergency care, the statutory duties relating to emergency
departments must be examined.
III. STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS OF HOSPITALS TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY
MEDICAL CARE TO INDIGENT PATIENTS
Despite several judicial decisions over the last two decades that
purport to ensure that all individuals have access to basic medical care, a
substantial and growing percentage of the population has no medical
insurance.134 The failure to remedy the problem by placing the
responsibility for indigent health care on the counties indicates that the
responsibility may be better placed elsewhere. Indeed, in giving the
emergency services system in California an F, the American College of
Emergency Physicians noted California’s “unique public health structure,”
pursuant to which “counties have been charged with many of the
responsibilities other states maintain at the state level.”135 It is therefore

130. Tailfeather v. Bd. of Supervisors, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 262 (Ct. App. 1996).
131. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, BAJI 6.00.1 (Spring ed. 2009).
132. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17100 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317(a)–(b)
(West 2008).
134. Jackson v. E. Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2001); Marshall v. E.
Carroll Parish Hosp. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1998); Power v. Arlington Hosp.
Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 859 (4th Cir. 1994); Guzman v. Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 637 F.
Supp. 2d 464, 481 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Magruder v. Jasper County Hosp., 243 F. Supp. 2d
886, 890 (N.D. Ind. 2003).
135. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 115, at 25.
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imperative to examine the other statutory requirements regarding the
provision of emergency health services.
A. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
In response to the national crisis in emergency care, in 1984 a new
section was appended to Medicare regulations. The legislation containing
the new section was entitled the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA).136 EMTALA applies to all hospitals with
emergency facilities participating in the Medicare program.137 The statute
protects all individuals who present themselves at emergency rooms,
regardless of whether the person is eligible for Medicare benefits.138
The law requires that the hospital examine each individual entering its
emergency room to determine if an emergency situation exists or if the
individual is in active labor.139 If either condition exists, the hospital
must render emergency care, provide treatment for labor, or provide for
an “appropriate transfer” to another medical facility.140 This duty is not
conditioned upon the patient’s ability to pay for services rendered and is
not accompanied by any guarantee of reimbursement by the federal
government.141
A hospital that negligently violates the above duty is subject to a civil
money penalty of not more than $50,000.142 Further, hospitals and
physicians are liable for civil fines of up to $50,000 for each negligent
violation of the statute. 143 Perhaps most importantly, however,
EMTALA provides that any individual who suffers personal harm or any
receiving facility that suffers a financial loss due to a violation may
bring a civil action for damages and equitable relief.144
From the standpoint of the present argument, the most serious
difficulty with EMTALA is that it imposes a substantial duty upon
hospitals without also providing funds to assist the hospitals in fulfilling
their duty. This duty is imposed upon facilities that have already entered
into Medicare contracts with the federal government. Ironically, the
specification of the remedies for violations of the statute will only make

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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the financial burden greater. The imposition of the duties under
EMTALA without the provision of funding is in a significant sense
hypocritical. The federal government is properly concerned that all
citizens receive emergency care regardless of ability to pay, but the
government is not willing to defray the immense cost associated with the
endeavor. The result will likely be more closing of emergency facilities
as well as a reduction in the number of hospitals willing to enter into
Medicare and Medicaid contracts with the federal government. A
reduction in the number of hospitals willing to take Medicare and
Medicaid patients could in turn cause chronic shortfalls in care in certain
areas for patients who are eligible for Medicare benefits and who have
no other coverage.
Despite the fact that EMTALA causes hospitals to incur significant
losses due to the requirement to provide uncompensated care, the
statutory scheme is not constitutionally infirm. In Whitney v. Heckler, a
group of physicians alleged that a temporary freeze in reimbursement
rates under Medicare constituted a taking of the physicians’ services due
to the fact that they could not charge their patients an additional amount
to make up for the shortfall.145 The court held that no taking had
occurred because participation in the Medicare program was voluntary.146
Similarly, in Minnesota Ass’n of Health Care Facilities v.
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, a regulation setting rates that
a nursing home could charge residents who were participants in the
Medicaid program was held not to be a taking because the nursing
homes were voluntary parties to the Medicaid contract.147 More
recently, the court in Franklin Memorial Hospital v. Harvey held that
low reimbursement rates in Maine’s Medicaid program did not
constitute a taking because the hospital’s participation in the program
was voluntary.148

145. Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986).
146. Id.
147. Minn. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.
2d. 442, 445–46 (8th Cir. 1984).
148. Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *7–
8, *11 (D. Me. Sept. 24, 2008), aff’d, 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009).
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B. Section 1317 of the California Health and Safety Code
Section 1317 of the California Health and Safety Code, adopted in
1973, requires facilities that have emergency departments to provide
emergency health care to persons in need thereof without regard to the
ability of the recipient to pay for such services.149 In this regard, the
statute embodies a right to health care. After receipt of the care, however,
the recipient must pay for or make an agreement to pay for the
services.150 In this sense, the statute implies that emergency health care
is a service for which the recipient must pay. However, payment is not a
necessary condition of the receipt of these services, as it is with other
services.151 Further, failure to pay for emergency health care previously
received would not be a bar to the receipt of future emergency health
care, as would be the case with any ordinary service.152
The statutory attempt to mandate universal access to emergency care
as manifested in section 1317 is noble in one sense and hypocritical in
another. It is laudable to provide for an enforceable right to health care,
but it is shortsighted and inequitable not to provide funding as well.
Indeed, section 1317 may be legally questionable precisely because of
the failure to provide funding together with the imposition of the duty to
provide care. The Bay General court’s reference to the fact that
emergency departments are “public service enterprise[s]” merely begs
the question as to the legitimacy of section 1317.153
C. Regulatory Takings Analysis
The issue of a regulatory taking is raised when a public entity imposes
regulations upon the use of private property for a public purpose. In
regard to a regulatory taking that does not involve a physical invasion or
occupation of real property, the courts apply the ad hoc balancing test as
articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.154
There are three published cases that have involved litigation regarding
the issue of whether or not the duty to provide emergency care to
indigents constitutes a taking, all of which involved the application of

149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317(d) (West 2008).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 1317(b).
152. See id.
153. Bay Gen. Cmty. Hosp. v. County of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191 (Ct.
App. 1984).
154. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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the ad hoc balancing test.155 The earliest is St. Joseph’s Hospital &
Medical Center v. Maricopa County, in which the plaintiff, a private
hospital, sued Maricopa County for the cost of rendering emergency care
required by a statute similar to section 1317 of the California Health and
Safety Code.156 In rejecting the takings argument, the court stated:
Traditional eminent domain cases shed some light on the question. The
typical eminent domain case involves the taking or regulation of real property
which diminishes or destroys the value of that property to the owner and provides a
direct benefit to the state. This case is atypical because the benefit—emergency
health care—inures to the patient directly. The only fiscal benefit the state enjoys is
that it does not have to pay for the patient’s care, unless the patient qualifies as
indigent. There is some authority for the proposition that the government must
pay for an unconstitutional taking of property, even if it is another who derives
the benefit. In any event, the eminent domain analysis provided in propertyuse-regulation cases will be our guide.
....
There are no set formulas for determining at which point a regulation effects
a taking of property. . . . Rather a two step process is required. First, we must
determine whether a legitimate state interest is substantially advanced by the
ordinance at issue. . . . Second, we focus on whether the ordinance denies the
owner the economically viable use of the land . . . . Ultimately the issue is
whether the public at large, rather than a few landowners should bear the burden
of an exercise of police power.
....
. . . We think it is beyond discussion that this requirement advances a
legitimate state interest . . . . As our supreme court stated in Thompson:
“If a person, seriously hurt, applies for . . . aid at an emergency ward . . . a
refusal might well result in worsening the condition of the injured person,
because of the time lost in a useless attempt to obtain medical aid.”157

With respect to the second criterion, the court stated:
Obviously, these regulations are not tantamount to a complete condemnation
of the hospital. The questions for the court then is whether the regulation is so
severe as to deny the owner a reasonable economic use of the property and
whether, in justice and fairness, the burden should fall on the hospital or on the
public as a whole.
The Penn Central Court, noting that this determination is essentially an ad hoc
factual inquiry, identified several significant factors. The first factor mentioned
in Penn Central is the economic impact of the regulation on the plaintiff,

155. Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *7
(D. Me. Sept. 24, 2008), aff’d, 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009); St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med.
Ctr. v. Maricopa County, 786 P.2d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
156. St. Joseph’s, 786 P.2d at 987.
157. Id. at 987–88 (citations omitted).
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particularly the extent that the regulation has interfered with the plaintiff’s
“investment-backed expectations.” We have absolutely nothing in the record to
indicate the extent to which these regulations have [a]ffected St. Joseph’s
profitability. We know that St. Joseph’s is unable to collect on the Neu account,
totaling $50,006.45. We do not know what percentage of that figure is expected
profit, nor do we know the impact these regulations have had on the hospital’s
overall profitability. Presumably, these “bad debts” are absorbed by the hospital as a
cost of doing business and are ultimately passed on to the consumer. St. Joseph’s
has not provided us with adequate information upon which we could determine
that it has suffered economic hardship tantamount to an unconstitutional
taking.158

The court found in that case that there was no unconstitutional taking.159
Several aspects of the St. Joseph’s court’s reasoning, however, are
patently questionable or of less relevance twenty years after the decision.
First, the court found that in principle a takings argument could be made,
but that in this particular case, there was insufficient evidence of
economic hardship resulting from the provision of care to the single
indigent patient.160 Second, since 1989, the number of uninsured in this
country has increased by approximately 30%.161 Third, since managed
care and fixed reimbursement rates became widespread in the 1990s, the
ability of hospitals to shift the burden of uncompensated care to those
with insurance coverage has been seriously curtailed.
With respect to the first criterion articulated in the Penn Central
decision, it is indisputable that the requirement that hospitals treat all
those with medical emergencies promotes an important state interest for
all patients. The material issue, however, is whether an unfunded mandate
that all hospitals be required to promote the public good is in the public
interest, given the long-term consequences thereof. The alarming data
regarding the number of emergency department and hospital closures
indicate that a policy that only considers the value of the requirement of
rendering care to all in need is shortsighted and does not promote the
state interest overall.
Further, given the issue in St. Joseph’s Hospital, it is clear that the
case has no precedential value with respect to whether laws requiring
hospitals with emergency departments constitute takings in general. In
St. Joseph’s, the issue before the court was whether the hospital’s duty to
provide uncompensated treatment to one individual constituted a taking

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 988 (citations omitted).
Id. at 988–89.
Id. at 988.
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUB. NO. P60-236,
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at
22, 59 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
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under the Penn Central analysis.162 Clearly, however, the cost of treating
one individual would not deprive the hospital of the economically viable
use of the land or would interfere with investment-backed expectations.
The larger issue is whether the duty to provide uncompensated care to all
in need thereof constitutes a taking. That is, the material issue in the
context of a taking is not, as the St. Joseph’s court held, the impact of the
debt of one indigent patient, but rather the entire burden of uncompensated
care that a particular hospital must bear.
It is important to note that nonprofit hospitals are dissimilar from
ordinary commercial properties in several respects. They are rightfully
considered to be communal assets, whose continued existence is an
important consideration, not just their profitability. Indeed, the reference
by the St. Joseph’s court to the necessity of access to emergency care for
all those in need indicates that hospital property is not akin to ordinary
private equity investments.163 Unlike a typical investment relationship,
hospitals, the majority of which are not for profit, are financed through
bond measures rather than equity investments such as stock.164 That is,
purchasers of bonds issued by nonprofit hospitals do not own any equity
interest in the facility, but rather are creditors thereof. Moreover, it is
not clear that the interests of equity investors and creditors are identical.
Equity investors are interested in return on investment, which requires a
risk-benefit analysis. A creditor, on the other hand, is more likely to be
concerned with long-term stability rather than the profitability of the
facility, insofar as he will not benefit from any accrual in value. Thus,
emphasis in Penn Central on the interests of investors may not be the
appropriate standard for assessing whether a taking has occurred in the
context of required emergency treatment for indigent patients at
nonprofit entities such as hospitals.
Even if the Penn Central criterion were relevant, however, it is
important to note that nonprofit hospitals experienced a severe
degradation of their investment positions beginning in 2008.165 It was

162. St. Joseph’s, 786 P.2d at 987.
163. Id. at 988.
164. See Tammy Lundstrom, Note, Under-Reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare
Hospitalizations as an Unconstitutional Taking of Hospital Services, 50 WAYNE L. REV.
1243, 1254–55 (2004).
165. See Claire Cowart Haltom, Factors Indicate Not-for-Profit Hospital Downgrades
Will Likely Continue Through 2009, AHLA BUS. L. UPDATE (Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n,
Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2009.
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reported that in 2008 an alarming increase in the downgrading of
nonprofit hospitals took place.166 By a ratio of eighteen to one, nonprofit
hospitals experienced a downgrading in their bond ratings, resulting in
higher costs for loans.167 The deterioration in the bond ratings of several
major hospitals in the United States was attributed to several factors,
including: (1) “softening” clinical revenue caused by patients deferring
elective procedures due to cost concerns; (2) intensifying competition
for a dwindling supply of insured patients; (3) increasing bad debt and
charity care due to rising rates of unemployment and costs of medical
services for indigent patients, as mandated by provisions; and (4) falling
reimbursement rates by third-party payers, including higher patient
deductibles.168
Thus, even on the assumption that the Penn Central analysis is
correct, data exist demonstrating that investors in nonprofit hospitals
have recently experienced degradation of the value of their investments,
and the degradation will likely accelerate through 2009 due to the
collapse of the economy. As one commentator has recently stated:
Not-for-profit hospitals heavily rely on bond debt to finance their projects. In
the past, the health care industry has been viewed as well-insulated from the
volatility of economic cycles, in part because of bond market security. This
recession, however, has wreaked more havoc on the bond markets than any other
recession in recent history.169

In addition, the Penn Central Court held that only a deprivation of all
economically viable uses of the property was actionable. Since the
decision in St. Joseph’s, however, courts have recognized that even
partial deprivations of economically viable uses of property may be
actionable. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court restated the
Penn Central criteria but allowed that:
Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on
a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government action. These inquiries are informed
by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from
“forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”170

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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Reflecting the holding in Palazzolo, the court in Cwynar v. City &
County of San Francisco171 stated the rule as follows:
[A] regulation may effect a taking even though it “leaves the property owner
some economically beneficial use of his property.” Such an owner simply loses
the benefit of the per se analysis. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged this fact in its recent decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.172

The amendment to the Penn Central requirement that to be actionable a
regulation must deprive the owner of all economically viable use of his
property is significant in regard to the requirement that emergency
departments render uncompensated emergency and related care. First,
the amendment permits hospitals to prove a taking has occurred if the
losses suffered from providing uncompensated care have caused the
hospital itself to be insolvent. Second, it allows hospitals to seek redress
for the closing of their emergency departments even if the remainder of
the hospital remains viable.
The second case in which the takings issue was litigated is Methodist
Hospital v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration, in which
the hospital and physicians filed a motion to enjoin the state agencies
from implementing new Medicaid regulations that included extremely
low reimbursement rates.173 One of the theories promulgated by the
plaintiffs was that the low Medicaid reimbursement rates constituted a
regulatory taking.174 The plaintiffs alleged that insofar as EMTALA
required the hospital and physicians to treat all indigent patients, the
regulations constituted a taking inasmuch as the rates were too low to
cover costs associated with the treatment.175
The court recognized that although property may be regulated to a
certain extent, “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”176 The court stated that this principle applied with equal force
to regulatory takings.177 However, when a service provider voluntarily

171. Cwynar v. City & County of San Francisco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 254–55 (Ct.
App. 2001).
172. Id. at 244 (citations omitted) (quoting Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 859 (Cal. 1997)).
173. Methodist Hosp. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 1309, 1314
(N.D. Ind. 1994).
174. Id. at 1317.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1334 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
177. Id. (citing Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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participates in a regulated program or activity, there is no legal
compulsion to provide services and thus there can be no taking.178 The
court noted that the plaintiff physicians claimed that they were
“mandated by federal law to examine and medically stabilize any
individual” who came to the hospital emergency department and
requested examination or treatment.179 The court held however that the
plaintiff physicians “do not argue, nor can they,” that individual
physicians were compelled to provide mandatory service because the
physicians were not obligated by law to practice medicine at Methodist
Hospital, nor were they obligated to serve Medicaid patients.180
The court noted however that whether or not the reimbursement rates
constituted taking the hospital’s property without due process of law was
a “more interesting question.”181 The court noted that “[t]here is no set
formula for determining when regulation of private property constitutes
a compensable taking.”182 Whether or not a particular restriction will be
rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses caused by
the regulation depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in
that] case.”183 Nonetheless, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
has identified several factors that have significance relative to this
inquiry. 184 The first of which is the economic impact of the
regulation.185 In particular, “the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”186
The Methodist Hospital court denied the State’s motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that several questions of fact remained in
dispute with respect to its takings argument. Specifically, the court
pointed to whether or not compensation paid to the hospital for
rendering emergency care constitutes a taking of the hospital’s property
pursuant to the criteria set forth in Penn Central.187
The distinction the Methodist Hospital court made between the
manner in which physicians and hospitals are reimbursed is reasonable.
There are differences in the formulas used to determine reimbursement

178. Id. at 1335 (citing Garelick, 987 F.2d at 916).
179. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 1992)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
187. Id. at 1335–36.
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rates for the two types of providers. The reimbursement rate for
physicians reflects the fact that physicians do not have fixed assets such
as expensive facilities, and that they are able to relocate to other
geographical areas if it is in their best interest to do so.188 Hospitals, on
the other hand, may only provide services pursuant to Certificates of
Need, which are issued in a manner that ensures that the allocation of
hospital services is controlled by the needs of the community rather than
the market. As a result, hospitals are at a distinct disadvantage in terms
of responding to unfavorable market conditions, such as the number of
uninsured. They may not relocate in any realistic sense, and they are
subject to the reimbursement rates set by Congress.189
Hospitals are thus extremely vulnerable to adverse results from
reimbursement rates that do not allow the hospital to remain viable.
Further, most of the 5815 hospitals in this country190 contract with the
federal Medicaid or Medicare programs, or both, because the sheer
volume of patients who qualify for coverage under one or both of the
programs renders participation in the programs necessary for hospitals.191
As such, participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs is
“voluntary” in only a technical sense.192
Nonetheless, the fact that hospitals participate in Medicare and
Medicaid programs by contract renders the hospital’s argument in
Methodist Hospital vulnerable to the response that it assumed the risk of
unfavorable reimbursement rates by virtue of entering into the contract
with the federal government and could refuse to participate in the
188. Compare 42 C.F.R. §§ 414.20, .22, .26, .28 (2008) (setting reimbursement
rates for physicians based on the cost of the procedure with no reimbursement for
capital-related costs), with 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.116, 413.130 (2008) (allowing hospitals to
be reimbursed for capital-related costs). See also, e.g., Methodist Hosp. v. Ind. Family &
Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 1309, 1316–17, 1335 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (discussing
Medicaid reimbursement rates for physicians in Indiana as being based on a per
procedure payment rate and holding that these rates did not constitute a taking because
physicians are free to relocate).
189. See Medicaid Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems and Fiscal Year 2004 Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,346 (Aug. 1, 2003) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413).
190. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FAST FACTS ON US HOSPITALS (2009), http://www.aha.org/
aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/Fast_Facts_Nov_11_2009.pdf.
191. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET
(2008), http://www.ihatoday.org/issues/payment/charity/underpymt.pdf.
192. See William S. Brewbaker III, Health Care Pricing Controls and the Takings
Clause, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 669, 672–76 (1994); Thomas Merrill, Constitutional
Limits on Physician Price Controls, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635, 642 (1994).

177

program in the future. Indeed, the argument that participation in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs is voluntary has been successfully
used as a defense in every case in which it has been asserted.193
The third and most recent case in which the requirement to provide
emergency care to indigents on the part of emergency departments was
litigated is Franklin Memorial Hospital v. Harvey.194 In Franklin, the
hospital sought a declaratory judgment that Maine’s “free care law”—
which requires hospitals to provide free health care to certain lowincome individuals—constitutes a regulatory taking.195 In denying the
plaintiff’s motion, the court held that pursuant to the Penn Central criteria,
no regulatory taking had occurred.196 The court based its conclusion on
examination of the “investment-backed expectations” criterion, affirming
the lower court.197 In holding that there were no reasonable investmentbacked expectations that were frustrated by the free care law, the trial
court stated:
[T]he existence of the Free Care Laws necessarily informs the expectations that
Franklin Memorial must have when it prospectively “invests” in medical
supplies or in its staff. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Franklin Memorial
understands that a portion of the medical supplies it purchases and a portion of
time the staff expends on patients simply will not produce a return on investment.
This understanding grows out of Franklin Memorial’s knowledge of the Free
Care Laws and out of its own non-profit health care mission. In other words,
viewed prospectively, Franklin Memorial restocks supplies and retains staff
knowing that a portion of the supplies and labor will be subject to the regulatory
obligation of the Free Care Laws. It is not a simple matter of having owned a
stockpile of supplies and labor capacity, all previously paid for, that suddenly,
out of the blue, were confiscated by operation of the Free Care Laws. Franklin
Memorial has been operating for years under this regulatory regime.198

As a result, the Franklin Memorial court held that because participation
in the state’s medical program is voluntary, there is no taking.199
The holdings in St. Joseph’s, Methodist Hospital, and Franklin
Hospital are all questionable because in each case the court assumed that
the regulations involved did not involve a physical invasion that was
countenanced by the state. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a California statute requiring owners
193. See, e.g., Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916–17 (2d Cir. 1993); Whitney
v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986).
194. Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009).
195. Id. at 123.
196. Id. at 126.
197. Id.
198. Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *4
(D. Me. Sept. 24, 2008), aff’d, 575 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009).
199. Id.
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of beachfront property to allow access to the beach by the public
constituted a “physical occupation” for purposes of regulatory takings
analysis:
We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private
use, “the right to exclude [others is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” In Loretto
we observed that where governmental action results in “[a] permanent physical
occupation” of the property, by the government itself or by others, “our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner.” We think a “permanent physical occupation”
has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent
and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be
traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself
permanently upon the premises.200

The Nollan Court restated the rule regarding mandated physical
occupations as articulated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., which held that physical occupations were not subject to the
balancing test contained in Penn Central:
Although this Court’s most recent cases have not addressed the precise issue
before us, they have emphasized that physical invasion cases are special and
have not repudiated the rule that any permanent physical occupation is a taking.
The cases state or imply that a physical invasion is subject to a balancing
process, but they do not suggest that a permanent physical occupation would
ever be exempt from the Takings Clause.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, as noted above, contains
one of the most complete discussions of the Takings Clause. The Court
explained that resolving whether public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad
hoc inquiry in which several factors are particularly significant—the economic
impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the governmental action. The opinion
does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government
action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other
factors that a court might ordinarily examine.201

The Nollan Court’s holding that mandated public access on a
continued basis constitutes a physical occupation even if no one person
has a right to remain on the premises is crucial in the context of
emergency medical treatment. Section 1317 of the California Health
200. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)).
201. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432–33 (citation omitted) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977)).
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and Safety Code mandates public access, but no individual has a right to
remain on the premises or to receive medical treatment on a continuing
basis.202 Nonetheless, the ongoing access by the public in the event of
medical need constitutes a permanent occupation. Consequently, as the
Loretto Court noted:
[W]hen the “character of the governmental action,” is a permanent physical
occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of
the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.
....
. . . [S]uch an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the
use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner,
since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the
invasion.203

The Loretto Court’s observation that a mandated occupation is
“qualitatively more severe” than a regulation of the use of the property is
particularly relevant in the context of the requirement to provide
emergency medical treatment. Hospitals have no control over the social
conditions that have resulted in an increasing number of uninsured
patients, they have no control over the expense of the treatment
rendered, and they have no control over the extent of the injuries
suffered by patients who are present at emergency departments.
Hospitals and medical personnel must render treatment consistent with
the applicable standard of care regardless of whether the patient has the
means to pay for the treatment. Any deviation from the standard of care
may result in civil liability, administrative penalties, or both. Finally,
hospitals have little or no control over the escalating costs of providing
such care. In short, hospitals have virtually no control over the factors
that result in the burden of uncompensated and undercompensated care
that they must provide.
To be actionable as a taking, however, the physical invasion by third
persons must be without the owner’s consent. The U.S. Supreme Court
in Yee v. City of Escondido held that owners of land had no takings
claim because they had initially consented to the occupation of their
property by the third parties prior to a rent control ordinance taking
effect.204 The Yee Court restated the rule articulated in FCC v. Florida
Power Corp.205 that once consent to occupation is given, any subsequent
202.
203.
124).
204.
205.
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disagreement over the terms of payment for the access is not a takings
issue but rather one of ordinary commercial litigation.206 Similarly, the
court in Adamson Cos. v. Malibu rejected a landowner’s takings
argument that the requirement to continue to furnish rental space to a
mobile home tenant at reduced rent control rates constituted a taking
“[b]ecause the park owners invited the tenants onto their land.”207 The
issue of initial consent is crucial. As the Yee Court stated: “A different
case would be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to
compel a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in
perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.”208 Therefore, if there is no
initial consent to occupation by third persons, a takings claim is tenable.
It is crucial to note that prior to the passage of section 1317 of the
California Health and Safety Code, there was no common law duty for
private hospitals to accept patients who had emergencies and with whom
there was no privity.209 Section 1317 requires all hospitals with emergency
departments to treat any person who is in need of emergency care, the
issue of privity notwithstanding.210 That is, section 1317 created a new
statutory obligation on the part of all hospitals, including private
hospitals.211 This section was adopted for the express purpose of
providing a significant benefit for the public at large.212 Therefore, there
is no prior consent required for medical care access by any third person
who has an emergency condition; access is mandated, thus satisfying the
requirements for a taking set forth in Loretto and Yee.
Also, the owner must suffer damages as a result of the occupation by
third parties. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the owners of a large shopping center had not stated a
claim for a regulatory taking.213 The owners had argued that mandated

206. Yee, 503 U.S. at 527.
207. Adamson Cos. v. City of Malibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476, 1499–500 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
208. Yee, 503 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added).
209. See Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001); Childs v. Weis,
440 S.W.2d 104, 106–07 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The
Evolution of the Legal Duty To Provide Emergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21, 25
(1989); Denise H. Field & Colleen M. Margiotta, Comment, To Treat or Not To Treat: A
Hospital’s Duty To Provide Emergency Care, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1982).
210. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 2008).
211. Id.
212. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1240, § 1(a).
213. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
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access to the commercial premises by a group of high school students
who wished to distribute political materials constituted a physical
invasion of their premises.214 The students wished to set up a table to
distribute informational pamphlets and other materials.215 The Court
held that no claim was stated because the owners could not prove that
the presence of the students was permanent and affected the ability of
the shopping center to conduct its commercial activities. The Court
distinguished the case from a factual situation in which adverse
economic impact from the occupation constituted a taking:
This case is quite different from Kaiser Aetna v. United States. Kaiser Aetna was
a case in which owners of a private pond had invested substantial amounts of
money in dredging the pond, developing it into an exclusive marina, and
building a surrounding marina community. The marina was open only to fee-paying
members, and the fees were paid in part to “maintain the privacy and security of
the pond.” The Federal Government sought to compel free public use of the
private marina on the ground that the marina became subject to the federal
navigational servitude because the owners had dredged a channel connecting it
to “navigable water.”216

In the case of mandated access to emergency services, however,
pursuant to the holding in Nollan, the serial occupation of the premises
by third persons on a permanent basis seems to constitute a physical
“invasion” in the requisite sense. Further, in Nollan, the Court held that
a permanent occupation was actionable as a taking even if the economic
impact was minimal:
In Loretto we observed that where governmental action results in “[a] permanent
physical occupation” of the property, by the government itself or by others, “our
cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner.”217

It is clear that under section 1317 unlimited mandated access to the
premises and services of private emergency departments constitutes a
“permanent physical invasion” as defined in Nollan and Yee. Further, as
in Kaiser and unlike the facts of Pruneyard, the right to access by third
parties conferred by section 1317 has had and will continue to have
disastrous economic consequences for private hospitals. The adverse
consequences begin even before indigent patients are present at

214. Id. at 77–78.
215. Id. at 77.
216. Id. at 85 (citations omitted) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
168 (1979)).
217. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
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emergency departments. Due in large part to the high number of
uninsured patients, emergency departments are overloaded.218 Patients
with emergency conditions, including many with medical insurance who
could have paid for services rendered, must be taken by ambulance to
emergency facilities that are not in close proximity, causing increased
expense and danger to the patients.219 Further, patients at many emergency
departments experience delays in treatment of several hours due to the
number of uninsured patients, who have delayed seeking needed care
and have arrived with emergency conditions.
Finally, the California Supreme Court has recently held that providers
of emergency medical services may not bill patients who have medical
insurance for the balance due after payment by the patient’s insurance
carrier. In Prospect Medical Group, Inc. v. Northridge Medical Group,
the court held that section 1317 of the California Health and Safety Code
and associated statutes express a legislative intent to “ensure the best
possible health care for the public at the lowest cost by transferring the
financial risk of health care from patients to providers.”220 Thus,
emergency departments must confront the greatly increasing burdens of
both uncompensated and undercompensated care.

218. For example, on average, Los Angeles County hospitals spend one out of every
four hours on “diversion,” in which case patients with emergency conditions must be
taken to other hospitals. NATASHA MIHAL & RENEE MOILANEN, UCLA SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS,
WHEN EMERGENCY ROOMS CLOSE: AMBULANCE DIVERSION IN THE WEST SAN FERNANDO
VALLEY 1 (2005).
219. See Linda R. Brewster et al., Emergency Room Diversions: A Symptom of
Hospitals Under Stress, ISSUE BRIEF: FINDINGS FROM HSC (Ctr. for Studying Health Sys.
Change, Wash., D.C.), May 2001, at 1, http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/312; Kerry
McKean Kelly, Healthcare’s Woes Converge in Overcrowded Emergency Rooms,
H EALTHCARE N.J. (N.J. Hosp. Ass’n, Princeton, N.J.), Feb. 2001, at 1 available
at http://www.njha.com/publications/HCNJ/HCNJV10No2.pdf.
220. Prospect Med. Group, Inc. v. Northridge Med. Group, 198 P.3d 86, 92 (Cal.
2009). The Prospect Medical Group decision has been seen as yet another factor in
reducing the amount of reimbursement that providers of emergency services receive. It
implies that providers will be required to file suit against third-party payers for
inadequate reimbursement. In many, if not most cases, it will not be feasible to do so
because of the cost of litigation. See Jeffrey Reeves et al., California Supreme Court
Deals a Blow to Healthcare Providers in Prospect Medical Group Decision, ORANGE
COUNTY BUS. J., Feb. 2, 2009, at 8.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the rulings in cases such as San Diego County,
Hunt, and Alford have theoretically ensured that indigent persons receive
public funding for emergency and medically necessary care, private
emergency departments and hospitals in California have not received the
benefit of such coverage. They continue to fail in record numbers. A
basis for a takings argument on the part of private emergency
departments and hospitals for recovery of costs incurred in providing
uncompensated and undercompensated care to indigents now exists. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has held, the state may not “forc[e] some
people . . . to bear . . . burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.”221 As the Court held in Nollan, if the
public requires private hospitals to treat all persons in need of
emergency care, the public “must pay for it.”222
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222.
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